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Abstract
In a story by Franz Kafka, a caged man endures hunger as a 
public spectacle, an act of self-starvation antithetical to life. The 
attraction lies in taking life to the precipice of extinction. In 
witnessing the diminishing of vitality to its vanishing point the 
value of life itself is somehow affirmed for the spectator.
Echoes of Kafka can be found in the late art of Tadeusz 
Kantor whose aesthetic of ‘poor reality’ underwent a radical 
transformation. As the ageing artist approached death he began 
to use himself as his own ‘found object’. Where Kafka martyred 
himself in his writing, Kantor became a version of Kafka’s 
‘Hunger Artist’ and put the condition of his encroaching death on 
display. In his painting he returned to figuration in a series of 
self-portraits, and his presence in his theatre changed from that 
of demiurge-creator to participant-victim.
This essay uses the metaphysics of Heidegger and 
Agamben to examine this turn in Kantor’s aesthetic in his series 
of late paintings and theatrical works between 1985 and his 
death in 1990.
Common to this late work is the motif of the ‘poor room of 
the imagination’, a metaphysical space in which the artist 
rehearses both a yearning for life and his departure from it. In 
using his art to confront his own condition Kantor can be seen 
to affirm the value of life even as it approaches the condition of 
extinction. In this sense Kantor eschews the negative endings 
of Kafka’s fictional heros.
(250 words)
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TADEUSZ KANTOR AS ‘HUNGER ARTIST’ IN THE ‘POOR 
ROOM OF THE IMAGINATION’
Introduction: Thrown into the stanza of being
The following discussion focuses on the major works of 
Tadeusz Kantor’s last decade, principally the works: Niech 
sczesną artiści (Let the Artists Die, 1985), Nigdy tu już nie 
powrócę (I Shall Never Return, 1988) and Dziś są moje 
urodziny (Today is My Birthday, 1991), together with his last 
cycle of paintings, Dalej już nic …  (Further on nothing … , 
1987–89). With his development of the idea of ‘the poor little 
room of the imagination’ from the schoolroom of The Dead 
Class to the family room of Wielopole, Wielopole, Kantor 
opened up the way to include himself more and more tangibly 
within his work. In doing so it is possible to draw a parallel 
between Kantor’s late work and that of Franz Kafka, especially 
Kafka’s late story ‘A Fasting Showman’ in the way that each 
used their work to deal with their own impending deaths. At 
stake in the metaphysics of mortality informing each artists’ 
work are issues concerning truth and freedom, which I shall 
discuss with reference to Heidegger and the early twentieth-
century Bohemian-Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–
1926). These, I shall show, add another dimension to 
understanding why Kantor called the theatre stage his ‘Poor 
Little Room of the Imagination’. With The Dead Class and 
Wielopole, Wielopole, and in his writings such as Theatrical 
Place, Kantor began to articulate his engagement with the 
problem of human being in terms of his idea of memory. The 
site of this engagement with memory became more and more 
clearly a room: at first a schoolroom in 1975 and then a family 
room in 1980. In later productions the identity of this room 
would shift its form and become a dying room, a prison cell and 
torture chamber in Let the Artists Die (1985), a disreputable inn 
of memory in I Shall Never Return (1988) and the artist’s own 
studio in Today is My Birthday (1991). Rooms also featured in 
Kantor’s late paintings and in the two cricotages that he created 
with students around the time he was working on his last two 
large-scale productions. In Bardzo krótke lekcja (A Very Short 
Lesson), performed at the Institut International de la Marionette 
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at Charleville-Mézières in 1988, material associated with I Shall 
Never Return, is set in a room inspired by a sketch for Kantor’s 
1989 painting Mój dom (My House), which depicts a smoking, 
ramshackled chimney stack, rising from bare floorboards in an 
otherwise empty room.1 Kantor never suffered the physical 
destruction of any of his homes. This ‘house’ is an idea of 
‘home’ that seems to owe more to Heidegger’s idea of the 
nature of the problematic dwelling of Dasein and its 
‘thrownness’ into the world than to any physical dwelling. The 
image of this chimney was fully realised in the scenography of 
Kantor’s last cricotage, Cicha noc (Silent Night) performed in 
Avignon in 1990 which was created during the period of 
rehearsals for Today is My Birthday. For Kantor, the ‘Poor 
Object’ had gradually come to include the idea of memory itself 
as an ‘object’, and in these last works the ideas coalesced into 
the conceit of the ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’:
—an open interior of our imagination—
which exists in a different dimension.
This is where the threats of our memory 
are woven;
where our freedom is born….
We are standing at the door giving a long 
farewell to our childhood;
we are standing helpless
at the threshold of eternity and death.
In front of us,
in this poor and dusky room,
behind the doors,
a storm and an inferno rage,
and the waters of the flood rise.
The weak walls of our ROOM;
of our everyday or
linear time
will not save us….
Important events stand behind the doors
it is enough to open them….
(Kantor 2009: 366. Ellipses in original).
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1 According to Anna Halczak, the painting depicts the only element of the 
house that had not been destroyed (Halczak 2005a).
This ‘room’ is a space replete with potential in which 
Kantor can ‘remember’ a pre-First-World-War Galician 
schoolroom that can metamorphose into a Jewish cheder; 
where he can ‘remember’ a wedding between his parents that 
occurred before his birth, and where Austro-Hungarian recruits 
colonise the corner of his childhood family room; where he can 
‘remember’ his own death occurring in the same family room 
where his six-year-old self played with his lead soldiers; where 
characters from his own past productions come back to 
remonstrate with him and where his father who left before he 
was born is ‘remembered’ as a grotesque tableau of his 
execution in Auschwitz; where an image of Jehovah tending to 
his creation mingles with that of a field hospital for the war-
wounded, where late friends from his artistic circle in Kraków 
share his studio with a dead hero from the era of Constructivism 
and where the celebration of his own birthday shares the same 
studio space with that of his father’s birthday celebrations 
depicted in a family photograph taken before he was born. The 
idea that the life of memory in the faculty of imagination, both 
individually and collectively, is the only reality—the truly real—is 
one that finds resonance in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, who, 
in one of his late poems stages his ‘Final Soliloquy of the 
Interior Paramour’ ‘in a room / In which we rest and, for small 
reason, think / The world imagined is the ultimate 
good’ (Stevens 1997: 444). The imaginative act, central to the 
act of poiesis, the production into being which is what, for 
Stevens, seems to be the essence of poetry, is related to 
Heidegger’s idea that ‘Language is the house of being. In its 
home human beings dwell’ (Heidegger 1998a: 239). Agamben 
develops this relationship in his 1996 essay ‘“Corn”: From 
Anatomy to Poetics’ (in Agamben 1999b), where he cites Dante 
Alighieri’s definition of the elements of poetic form in his De 
vulgari eloquentia, II, IX, 2–3:
And here you must know that this word 
[stanza] was coined solely for the purpose 
of discussing poetic technique, so that the 
object in which the whole art of the 
canzone [song] was enshrined should be 
called a stanza, that is, a capacious 
storehouse or receptacle for the art in its 
entirety. For just as the canzone is the lap 
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of its subject-matter, so the stanza enlaps 
its whole technique […].
(Dante Alighieri 1996: 72–73. Cited in 
Agamben 1999: 35. His emphasis)
Stanza is of course the Italian word for ‘room’. Agamben 
uses this thirteenth-century idea of stanza2—‘a capacious 
storehouse or receptacle’—as a metaphor for Being, for 
Heidegger’s ‘house of being’. For Dante the stanza was a 
container for the poet’s art, a ‘room’ in which the poem’s 
meanings were contained and in which they dwelt. In this sense 
they were like the Heraclitean ideas of ēthos and moira: the 
span of human life viewed as the ‘allotted portion’ or container 
for the individual’s existence (see Kahn 1979: 231–232). 
Viewed in this way it is possible to see how Kantor’s rooms, and 
his idea of the room, is able to operate for him as a stage for 
human being. ‘The Poor Little Room of the Imagination’ 
facilitates a space for the free play of memory, sometimes 
personal and sometimes collective (in the sense used by 
Maurice Halbwachs 1980 and 1992). In the final decade of his 
life Kantor played with this idea almost obsessively.
Human and Animal Being and their Relation to Finitude
In his 1929 lectures on the fundamental concepts of 
metaphysics Heidegger, citing a fragment of Novalis, 
characterised the human condition as a state of homesickness 
(1995: 5). For Heidegger, human being, ‘thrown’ into the world, 
found itself out of attunement. Heidegger’s solution to this state 
of restlessness was to formulate a conception of human being, 
or Dasein, that was based on an attempt to establish a 
fundamental difference between animal and human nature. In 
order to do this he made use of radical contemporary scientific 
theories of the nature of living things in order to establish a 
particular understanding of the hierarchical ranking of human 
and animal life.
In his late short story, ‘A Fasting Showman’ (1922)—part 
of a suite of four short stories written and prepared for 
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2 Agamben had highlighted this definition at the beginning of his second 
book published in 1977: Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture 
(1993).
publication shortly before his death by consumption in 1924 and 
published together under the title ‘A Hunger Artist’—Kafka 
portrays his protagonist as a dying, caged human being, who is 
placed in direct competition with the animal menagerie of the 
circus in which he is exhibited. The hunger artist is compared 
unfavourably with the other animal attractions and is eventually 
thrown out and replaced by a vibrant young panther. Kafka was 
influenced by Rilke’s poetry, and Heidegger, in a later series of 
lectures delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1942–43 on 
the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, also makes reference 
to Rilke in his discussion of the poet’s eighth Duino Elegy, a 
poem written in the same year as ‘A Fasting Showman’.3 The 
eighth Duino Elegy deals with the concept of the ‘open’, which 
Rilke uses to make an unfavourable comparison between 
humans and animal nature in general. For Rilke, the ‘natural’ 
state of the animal lends it a more ‘open’ nature, whereas 
human being is turned back upon itself, closing itself up to 
possibilities. In its eulogisation of animal nature this poem 
prefigures the vital freedom suggested by Kafka’s panther in 
contrast with the discarded hunger artist. Heidegger however, in 
his discussion of this poem, reverses Rilke’s hierarchical 
ranking by arguing that it is humans that truly see the open 
rather than animals.4
Both Rilke’s and Heidegger’s contrasting visions of the 
relative ranking of human and animal nature hinge on a 
metaphysical preoccupation with death. For Rilke, ‘nearing 
death, one doesn’t see death; but stares beyond, perhaps with 
an animal’s vast gaze’ (1987: 193). For Heidegger, the essential 
radical nature of human being was finitude, or being-for-death—
the essential transitoriness of human existence. The implication 
of Heidegger’s perspective is that Rilke’s animal’s ‘vast gaze’ is 
simply innocent ignorance; only the sentience of human being 
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3 The inspiration for Kafkaʼs panther is thought to have been Rainer Maria 
Rilkeʼs 1903 poem ʻThe Panther in the Paris Zooʼ (Rilke 1987: 25). However, 
Rilkeʼs panther is rather a sad animal in comparison to Kafkaʼs. Heidegger 
makes no reference to this poem and it is rather the account of the vibrancy 
of animal nature in the eighth Duino Elegy that provides the matter for his 
discussion.
4 For a stimulating recent discussion of Heidegger, Rilke and the concept of 
ʻopenʼ see: Agamben 2004.
truly has the potential to transcend its situation by recognising 
the imminence of death as an essential defining feature of its 
being.
Franz Kafka was also much preoccupied with death, which 
often occurs in his writing with reference to animal nature (as 
with, for example, Jozef K., who, on the final page of The Trial, 
dies ‘like a dog’—‘as if the shame of it would outlive him’ (Kafka 
1977: 254). As Joachim Beug has pointed out in his 1980 essay 
‘The Cunning of a Writer’ Kafka’s writing of death scenes ‘was 
inseparably entangled with the anticipation of his own 
death’ (1980: 131). In his diaries and letters Kafka often referred 
to the anticipation of his own end: ‘Sometimes a naïve person 
will wish, “I would like to die and see how everyone mourns 
me”—this is the scene such a writer is continually 
staging’ (Kafka cited in: Beug 1980: 132). Indeed, Kafka’s tale 
about the hunger artist was intimately connected with his own 
death. Kafka had completed his tale, which was clearly a 
reflection of his own worsening tuberculosis, in 1922. It was one 
of the few tales that he permitted his friend Max Brod to have 
published and he died in bed in 1924 whilst correcting the 
proofs (see Gilman 2005: 116 and 129). 
Kantor too was an artist much preoccupied with death 
and, like Kafka, he was also involved in his artistic work right up 
to his end. Kantor was in the middle of making the final 
adjustments and preparations to what was to be his last theatre 
spectacle, Today is My Birthday, when he died on December 
the eighth 1990. In their artistic attempts to deal with the 
existential anxiety of the human condition, both Kafka and 
Kantor made a home for themselves in their work. Moreover, in 
both his theatre and, in the paintings made during the last years 
of his life, Kantor was continually staging his own death. 
However, Kantor went even further than Kafka in actually 
putting himself on public display in the repeated pictorial and 
theatrical depictions of his soon-to-be-expiring self. The self that 
Kantor is exhibiting is one that is approaching death and with 
this passage towards non-existence and the apparent growing 
awareness of the poor fragile nature of the human individual 
Kantor might be likened to Rilke’s animal who ‘stares beyond’ 
death. However, in his increasing willingness to confront his 
own impending mortality, Kantor can rather be seen as a ‘poor’ 
version of Heidegger’s conception of fully-realised human 
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Dasein wrestling with the difficult reality of the finitude of human 
existence. 
The following discussion uses the problematic 
juxtaposition between the hunger artist and the panther in 
Kafka’s tale, together with a consideration of Heidegger’s 
analyses of human and animal worlds and of the questions 
raised, as a key to understanding this final turn towards the 
confrontation of Kantor’s own impending mortality in his late 
work. 
In the preparations Today is My Birthday (1991), Kantor 
intended to exhibit himself on stage.5 He declared:
I have decided to move in and live on 
stage—
I have here my bed, my table, my chair, 
and,
of course, my paintings.
I have often imagined my room in a 
theatre,
inside of the theatre,
on stage, rather than in a hotel.
So, my—as I call it—Poor Little Room of 
Imagination
is placed on stage.
(Kantor in Di Mambro 1991: 6; Kantor 
2005: 232)
In 1968 Kantor had previously anatomised an anonymous 
stranger’s clothing and pockets in his Anatomy Lesson 
According to Rembrandt in order to identify ‘the genuine, / 
authentic side of / individuality, / the forgotten leftovers, / the 
shameful litter, / these wrinkled and crushed / p o c k e t s ! / 
ridiculous organs of / human / instincts / given for preservation / 
and memory!’ (Kantor 1976: 26, my translation). In his final 
production he seemed to want to anatomise his own ‘authentic 
individuality’.
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5 ʻI am not the author. / No! I am something / more, / I am / in the very 
centre / of that which is going on / on stageʼ (Kantor in Kraszewski 1994: 
398).
The setting Kantor conceived for himself was in the form 
of his own artist’s studio, with a table and chair, washbasin, 
stove and a bed. Three large picture frames defined the space 
of the room. The picture frame to the left contained the author’s 
living self-portrait, played by Andrzej Welmiński, seated with 
characteristic hat, scarf and coat. In the frame to the right was a 
figure in black lace depicting one of Kantor’s paintings based on 
the figure of the Infanta Margarita de Austria from Velázquez’ 
painting of 1656 Las Meninas. In between and to the rear and 
facing the audience stood the large, central frame that would 
depict a re-enactment of a family photograph of Kantor’s 
father’s birthday celebration. From a central door in the 
darkness behind this large frame and from the other gloomy 
corners of this ‘Poor Room’ would enter various dead relatives 
and friends and the ‘massed forces of history’ that assaulted the 
artist in his refuge. Two figures, the author’s ‘shadow’ and a 
cleaning lady, supervised the ‘Poor Room’ and attempted to 
restore order following each incursion from the outside.
Kantor’s on-stage studio was not just a ‘room’ but also, as 
he said, a ‘Poor Room of the Imagination’. As such it was a 
metaphysical room, a metaphorical space situated on the 
border between two realities: conventional reality represented 
by the audience on one side, and the reality of the eternal world 
of fiction, art and memory on the other, installed by the portals 
formed by the three picture frames that defined the stage area. 
Kantor described this ‘Poor Room’ as ‘a dark hole into which fall 
various objects from the outside’ (Kantor cited in Pleśniarowicz 
2004: 277). It is therefore clearly a vision of the imagination or 
the human mind: the world of individual subjective 
consciousness into which the objective world ‘falls’. However, 
Kantor’s metaphorical room would also seem to be a ‘poor’ 
version of the active, projecting mind championed in nineteenth-
century Romantic metaphors. In Romantic philosophy the mind 
was a Neoplatonic ‘candle of the Lord’, that, unlike the passive 
mirror or tabula rasa of the English Enlightenment philosopher 
John Locke, was an active partner in creating the world as 
opposed to a passive agent: a lamp rather than a mirror (see: 
Abrams 1979: 57–69). Of course, Kantor’s Romantic heritage 
was of a specifically Polish character. It is therefore not 
surprising that a sense of cruel fatalism informs his model of the 
mind. In the ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’ Kantor, his 
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memories and art, shelter from the outer world, represented by 
war and the figures and agents of authority. Kantor envisaged 
this ‘Poor Little Room’ as the ultimate refuge or dwelling of the 
fragile individual human being. Kantor died on December the 
eighth before the final dress rehearsal of Today is My Birthday. 
The production that premiered in Toulouse on January 10, 1991 
and that subsequently completed its tour of major European 
cities and New York, did so without its creator, in the almost-
finished state that Kantor left it in.6
Kantor had already exhibited theatrical versions of his own 
death in his preceding two major spectacles in response to the 
growing sense of his own impending mortality. In Let the Artists 
Die identical twin actors repeatedly enact an imagined 
bedridden consumptive death, with one of the twins taking the 
part of the artist’s dying body and the other acting as a witness 
to the event. In I Shall Never Return the setting was a ‘Poor Inn 
of Memory’ to which Kantor returned, carrying a coffin as a 
blatant symbol of his own death.
On the Threshold
It was not only in his theatrical work that Kantor began to place 
himself on public display. Between 1985 and 1988 Kantor 
produced an extraordinary series of paintings which were 
exhibited in Kraków in 1988 under the title Further on, Nothing 
… . These paintings were a shock to many of Kantor’s critics as 
they marked a turn away from the particular avant-garde 
strategies of his previous paintings which had been 
preoccupied with the abstraction of informel, the aesthetics of 
emballage and the happening. These new paintings marked a 
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6 In the performance of Today is My Birthday that actually played after 
Kantorʼs death, the dead artistʼs absence was made present by an oil lamp 
placed on the on-stage table where he was to have been seated during the 
performance. In the opening sequence this lamp was lit for the duration of 
the performance by Andrzej Welmiński, the actor who played the part of 
Kantorʼs self-portrait. At certain points during the performance Welmiński 
would protectively pick up the oil lamp to shelter it from the hostile forces 
that periodically invaded the room.
return to figuration7 and in many of them the figure depicted (as 
indeed Andrzej Żurowski complained about the artist’s onstage 
presence in his 1985 essay)8 was Kantor himself. In the 
paintings dating mostly from 1987, Kantor depicted himself in a 
number of narrative situations that employed playful paradoxes 
embodied in their titles: Mam dość siedzenia w obrazie. 
Wychodzę (I’ve had enough of sitting in this painting. I’m 
leaving, 1987); Trzymam obraz, na którym jestem namalowany 
jak trzymam obraz (I am holding a picture in which I am shown 
holding a picture, 1987); and Ścieram obraz, na którym jestem 
namalowany jak ścieram obraz (I am wiping off the picture in 
which I am shown wiping off a picture, 1987).9 In these works 
the paradox is achieved by the addition of sculptural objects 
which extend the figure beyond the confines of the canvas into 
the ‘real world’. Artificial legs and arms continue the painted 
limbs into real space in such a way that the painterly 
representation of Kantor seems to achieve the impossible: of 
stepping out of the painting, of holding his own painting of 
himself up, or of wiping off the paint from the very canvas that 
portrays him.
Although these paintings are in one sense clearly a return 
to figuration, the representational instability that the playful 
conceits and additions lend to these canvases make them 
every bit a continuation of Kantor’s critique of representation as 
any of Kantor’s work. In a sense these paintings perform their 
own self-criticism. Just as Malevich’s Black Square is not a 
representation of a black square, but a black square in its own 
right; similarly Kantor’s self-portraits clearly signal what they are 
by going so far in the attempt to create an illusion that they 
render themselves as three-dimensional objects in their own 
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7 Along with many of his colleagues who had experienced the reality of Nazi 
occupation, Kantor had made a conscious turn away from figurative painting 
after the war in response to the vivid memories of wartime cruelty. These late 
paintings marked a return to figuration after a period of some forty years. For 
an account of the paintings in this exhibition see Borowski (1989) and 
Gołubiew (2000).
8 See Żurowski 1985.
9 See Kantor 1991a: plates 263, 262 and 268; The Polish titles and dates are 
taken from Gołubiew 2000: 13, 14 and 17.
right. Whereas in naturalistic paintings and films, the aim is for 
the viewer to forget the medium by being engrossed in the 
illusory reality of the represented world, in Kantor’s late 
paintings this is not possible. Even the titles draw attention to 
their status as real objects in the real world at the same time as 
alluding to the ridiculous and impossible actions they purport to 
perform.
The apparent playfulness of the 1987 paintings belies a 
certain darker restlessness, for the paintings from 1988 eschew 
sculptural extensions and rely purely on painterly means to 
achieve a more sombre affect. In the self-portraits in this later 
sequence, Kantor’s self-portrayal has more the sense of himself 
as a victim, or prisoner. Whereas in the sculptural paintings the 
figure seemed to emanate a vital energy, in these later 
paintings there is the sense of frailty, infirmity and death. In 
Mam wam coś do powiedzenia (I have something to tell you, 
1988) an emaciated, naked figure of an aged Kantor stares 
forlornly out of a black background directly at the observer. In 
Pewnego dnia żołdak napoleoński z obrazu Goi wtargnął do 
mego pokoju (One day Napoleon’s soldier from Goya’s painting 
invaded my room, 1988) the figure of Kantor, dressed in 
Bohemian coat, hat and scarf, after the manner of Craig, stands 
in frail defiance as one of the soldiers from Goya’s 1814 
painting, The Executions of the Defenders of Madrid, takes aim 
at him. In another series of paintings from the same year, titled 
Cholernie spadam!/I am falling down like hell! 1988) the naked 
and emaciated figure of the artist appears to float over 
featureless landscapes in which the church from his home 
village of Wielopole sits in the distance. Finally, and in stark 
contrast to the sculptural escape from the earlier work I’ve had 
enough of sitting in this picture …, a painting depicting Kantor 
on his deathbed illuminated by a single candle against a black 
background, is titled: W tym obrazie muszę pozostać [Z tego 
obrazu już nie wyjdę] (In this picture I must stay [From this 
picture I cannot leave], 1988).10 This prefigures Kantor’s 
decision to ‘move in and live on stage’ in Today is My Birthday. 
This only serves to highlight the sense of continuum between 
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10 See Kantor 1991a: plates 261 (titled here, Autportrait), 265 and 269 (The 
Cholernie spadam! series is not reproduced in this album); The Polish titles 
and dates are taken from Gołubiew 2000: 11, 19, 23–26 and 20.
painting and performance in Kantor’s work: his theatre 
spectacles are moving paintings; his playful paintings imply 
performance.
As I have already indicated, this increasing preoccupation 
with the presentation of his soon-to-be-expiring self in his late 
work suggests parallels between Kantor and the protagonist in 
Kafka’s tale about the hunger artist. The fasting showmen of the 
late nineteenth century, upon which Kafka’s figure is apparently 
based, starved themselves for around forty days and then 
celebrated the end of this successful feat of endurance with a 
large feast. On December the twenty first 1890, Giovanni Succi 
broke a forty-five-day fast in New York. As the Daily Tribune 
reported: ‘Succi arose from his couch and then it seemed as if 
the persons looking at him were welcoming him back from the 
grave a long-lost brother’ (cited in Russell 2006: 4). By staging 
an approach to death by self-starvation and then turning back 
from the brink, the performance of the hunger artist could be 
seen as life-affirming: death has been denied and the appetite 
for life re-embraced. The hunger artist’s self-sacrifice becomes 
a rebirth and therefore a cause for celebration. Kafka’s hunger 
artist, however, desires to go beyond the normal pattern for his 
fasts and break his previous record. He wants to excel at his 
‘art’. But, as Kafka’s story finally reveals, the artist was simply a 
fussy eater who couldn’t find anything he liked to eat (Kafka 
1978: 173–174). For Kafka, the hunger artist, together with the 
other protagonists in the collection he was correcting for the 
publisher at the time of his death, stands as a symbol of the 
existential nature of the artist’s troubled relation to society. 
Kafka’s artist wants to do a good job, but, because he starves 
himself out of a lack of appetite, he knows that he is, in a sense, 
a fraud. The very reason for his success, the fact that fasting is 
so easy for him, means that it isn’t really much of an 
achievement and contributes to his sense of failure: the very 
reason that he should not be admired. Because of this, Kafka’s 
protagonists appear to be not so life-affirming, but rather to 
exemplify Nietzsche’s view of a ‘sick’ and problematic humanity: 
a sick species in existential crisis.  As Nietzsche comments in 
On the Genealogy of Morals: ‘man is more sick, more uncertain, 
more mutable, less defined than any other animal, there is no 
doubt about that—he is the sick animal …’ (Nietzsche 1996: 
100).
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One of the most telling aspects of Kafka’s story is that the 
hunger artist, placed in direct competition with the circus’s 
animal menagerie, loses the public’s interest and is eventually 
thrown out and replaced by ‘a young panther’. (In typically 
Kafkaesque fashion, the hunger artist, ‘in order to spare his own 
feelings … avoided reading the conditions of his 
contract’ (Kafka 1978: 170).) This beast captures the public’s 
attention completely and seems to be presented by the Jewish, 
consumptive Kafka as the complete antithesis of the weak and 
starving artist: the new animal is like a Blakean Tyger, ‘burning 
bright’ with vital energy and a healthy appetite. As Kafka puts it, 
the panther’s:
noble body, furnished almost to bursting 
point with all that it needed, seemed to carry 
freedom around with it […] the joy of life 
streamed with such ardent passion from his 
throat that for the onlookers it was not easy 
to stand the shock of it. But they braced 
themselves, crowded round the cage and did 
not want ever to move away.
(Kafka 1978: 174)
The public in Kafka’s story, uninterested in his version of 
the hunger artist, find themselves captivated by the apparent 
life-affirming spectacle of the panther.
Perhaps panthers are to be preferred? But if they are 
more desirable why is the ‘noble body’ of the panther taken as 
such an attractive and powerful antidote to the emaciated and 
sickly, but still human form of the hunger artist? This apparent 
inversion in the usual relation in rank between humans and 
animals in the final paragraph of Kafka’s tale relates to the 
similar reversal in Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy. In Rilke’s poem 
‘With all its eyes the natural world looks out / into the Open. 
Only our eyes are turned / backward … like traps …’ (1987: 
193). For animals, according to Rilke’s poem, ‘everything is 
womb’ (Ibid.: 195) for, like Kafka’s panther, they carry their 
world around with them: they are ‘at home in the world’ in 
contrast to Heidegger’s conception of humanity as existing in a 
state of ‘homesickness’. As Heidegger discusses in his lectures 
on Parmenides:
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According to Rilke the animal sees more 
than man does, for the animal’s gaze is not 
trammelled by any objects but can go on 
infinitely, in some unknown way, into the 
objectless. The animal has before itself the 
limitless. It never encounters a limit on its 
path, hence not even death. The animal is 
‘free from death’ as it goes on into the 
limitless; its advance is never doubled back, 
as is the case with human representing, and 
it never sees what is behind itself.
(Heidegger 1998b: 157–8)
Heidegger’s account of Rilke’s view of the animals’ 
‘openness’ carries connotations of Craig’s description of the 
‘carved eyes’ in the figures in Ancient Egyptian art that carry a 
strong sense of death that ‘will deny you until the crack of 
doom’ an ‘attitude so silent that it is death-like’ (Craig 1958: 87). 
This ‘gaze’ also seems reminiscent of the implacable gaze of 
the eyes of icons, which famously appear to follow their 
observers around the room.
Concerning humanity Rilke asks: ‘Who has twisted us 
round like this, so that / no matter what we do, we are in the 
posture of someone going away?’ (1987: 197). From a 
Nietzschean perspective Kafka’s figure of the panther is 
perceived by the public as refreshingly free from the ‘sickness’ 
of the hunger artist who stands, instead, as an unwelcome 
reminder of their own ‘sick’ humanity with his unhealthy ‘game 
with death’. The panther embodies a pure ‘will to life’ and, as 
Heidegger points out, knows nothing of death. It is this that so 
captivates the public. The hunger artist, however, is caught in 
his game between desire for public recognition and the desire 
to justify his ‘art’, which he practices, after all, out of habitual 
compulsion rather than conscious choice. In this he is caught in 
the dilemma of the artist analysed by Agamben in The Man 
Without Content (1999), in conflict between creative desire and 
the aesthetic ‘taste’ of the spectator. He, therefore, embodies 
the messy reality of human existence characterised by this split, 
caught up in its own self-regard and petty contingent worries 
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and concerns which contrasts with the panther’s apparent purity 
of being.
For Heidegger, Rilke’s version of the hierarchical 
relationship between animal and human being was an illusion: 
the apparent freedom carried around by the animal is rather a 
consequence of the limited nature of its existence. According to 
Heidegger it is humanity who have the true potential for 
freedom. The essence of human being, for Heidegger, lies 
exactly in the finitude of its existence, and the ‘sickness’ of 
humanity lies not in any morbid preoccupation with death but 
rather in its failure to accept and dwell within this essential 
being-for-death. For Heidegger it is, paradoxically, death that 
defines us11 and only humanity has the capacity for the 
recognition that opens the individual up to the true nature of 
being. This recognition of the mortal context of existence is, for 
Heidegger, denied to animal nature. For Rilke, it is only the 
animal that sees the open, whereas, for Heidegger, it is only 
human being that has this capacity.
In his lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics (1995) Heidegger outlined a ranking of the 
categories of the inanimate, the animal and the human, and 
sets forth the thesis that the stone is worldless, the animal is 
poor in world, and the human being is world-forming (1995: 
177). In this discussion Heidegger refers extensively to the 
theories of the Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll, focussing 
on his concept of Umwelt or the environment of the living 
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11 ʻFinitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our 
fundamental way of beingʼ (Heidegger 1995: 6).
creature as subjectively perceived.12 For Uexküll, each animal 
exists in a world which it knows only through a limited number 
of ‘carriers of significance’ which act as ‘disinhibitors’ or triggers 
for certain aspects of the creature’s repertoire of behaviour. 
Heidegger takes this idea and uses it to sketch out a sense of 
the difference between animal and human being. As Heidegger 
puts it ‘Plant and animal are suspended in something outside of 
themselves without ever being able to ‘see’ either the outside or 
the inside’ (1998: 160). In his famous description of the Umwelt 
of the tick, Uexküll had sought to demonstrate that the animal 
knows nothing of the world it moves and acts in other than the 
specific ‘carriers of significance’ in its environment. As such, 
according to Heidegger, the animal lives in a circle of 
captivation, bound within the horizon of the specific stimuli with 
which it is adapted to interface. The more complex the animal, 
the less limiting the ‘circle of captivation’ and the more varied 
the Umwelt. With animals, any sense of awareness beyond this 
horizon is mere anthropomorphism on the part of the human 
observer; animals simply do not have the capacity  to transcend 
their Umwelt. It is this lack of ability to question the horizon of 
their world that Heidegger interprets as poor in world: the idea 
that the animal is trapped or ‘captivated’ in a perfectly 
engineered interlocking set of stimuli and responses. Uexküll 
uses as an illustrative example of the perfect ‘captivation’, and 
state of blissful sympathy with which it is enjoined with its world, 
the humble tick, which survives with only three ‘carriers of 
significance’: the odour of butyric acid characteristic of 
mammalian sweat, the temperature of 37° characteristic of the 
temperature of mammalian blood, and the typology of 
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12 The new scientific conceptions of the nature of living things were not only 
of interest to Heidegger. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his 1950s lecture course 
on Nature refers to Uexküll along with the theories of other influential 
biologists such as George Ellet Coghill, whose Anatomy and the Problem of 
Behaviour (1964, originally published in 1929) had been influential in Gestalt 
psychology. These new conceptions were of interest to phenomenologists 
like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty because of their non-mechanical, anti-
Cartesian and anti-dualistic conceptualisation of nature and the living 
creature. These philosophers found the naturalistsʼ work useful in their 
argument with the views of the mechanistic school of Behaviourism which 
was prevailing at the time (See: Merleau-Ponty 2003: 140–5 and 167–178). 
For a further discussion of Heideggerʼs use of Uexküll in relation to Rilke and 
the ʻopenʼ see Agamben 2004.
mammalian skin (see Agamben 2004: chapter 11). But, insofar 
as all animals (except, according to Heidegger, humans) are 
defined by their carriers of significance, the number makes little 
difference: Rilke’s animal and Kafka’s panther no more ‘sees’ its 
environment than Uexküll’s tick has a conception of the warm-
blooded host that it drops onto. Conversely, human beings have 
the capacity, according to Heidegger, to form their own world 
because they, unlike animals, have the potential to see beyond 
their immediate Umwelt and sense the wider context of their 
existence. It is in this sense of the ‘open’ as the potential to 
transcend the horizon of their Umwelt  that characterises 
Heidegger’s idea of openness in contrast to Rilke’s. As Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty noted in the course notes for his lectures 
delivered at the Collège de France from 1957–58 on The 
Concept of Nature: ‘Animality, the Human Body and the 
Passage to Culture’, that the Umwelt of human beings is more 
open than that of animals (2003: 178).
Kafka’s panther only appears, therefore, to express a 
sense of freedom in comparison to the hunger artist. Its strong 
body threatens to burst from the confines of its cage giving a 
sense of barely-restrained danger that threatens to transcends 
the boundaries of its prison: ‘Even the most insensitive felt it 
refreshing to see this wild creature leaping around the cage that 
had so long been dreary’ (Kafka 1978: 174). Like Rilke’s 
animals in the Duino Elegy the panther seems to carry its 
Umwelt around with it. In contrast, the hunger artist does not 
convey the full potential of human being. By allowing himself to 
be placed next to the other animals, Kafka’s hunger artist 
emanates a sense of defeated, caged humanity. In this sense 
the hunger artist points towards the denial of the potential of 
human being—and death—whilst the panther points vividly 
towards a sense of its, more limited, life.
‘I’ve had enough of sitting in this painting—I’m leaving’
It might seem at first that the Umwelt of Kantor’s self portrayals
—the spaces of the painting and the ‘Poor Room of the 
Imagination’ in which he imagines his existence—present just 
as bleak and closed a vision of humanity as that in Kafka’s story 
of the caged hunger artist. However, this is not the effect 
evoked by these works.
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In one of the paintings from 1987, I’ve had enough of 
sitting in this painting. I’m leaving, the figure of Kantor seems 
reminiscent of both Rilke’s image of a humanity ‘twisted 
around’ and also, at the same time, of Kafka’s panther. In this 
painting Kantor depicts himself in the act of stepping out of the 
fictional, two-dimensional world of the picture into the real, 
three-dimensional, world of the observer. In this sense the 
picture would seem to enact an escape from the confines of the 
Umwelt of the picture frame, showing also, perhaps, an 
unwillingness to simply sit down and accept the given situation 
of existence. However, the figure’s orientation towards the world 
of the painting and the world of external reality contains a 
number of paradoxes. The figure of Kantor is in one sense only 
partially visible, his torso, right arm and shoulder, and left leg 
are cut off by the left-hand edge of the canvas that he is in the 
process of leaving. Instead of looking out towards the reality he 
is stepping into, the upper part of the figure is turned back, like 
Rilke’s image of humanity, to look under his raised left arm, 
towards the right of the picture at the chair where he was sitting. 
As with the figure, the chair is only half visible, also cut off, in 
this case by the right-hand edge of the canvas. Only the left leg 
of the figure has actually made it to the outside world in the 
form of a three-dimensional artificial leg attached to the edge of 
the canvas. In its posture and attitude, the figure of Kantor in 
this painting might be seen as a ‘poor’ and ‘reversed’ version of 
Lissitzky’s New Man. In that picture, the clean cut and confident 
geometry of the mechanical figure is striding dynamically from 
left to right, not right to left as Kantor’s is. Also, Lissitzky’s figure 
looks confidently forward whereas Kantor’s looks backwards 
into the picture. In comparison to Kantor’s naked figure, 
Lissitzky’s vibrant figure seems to have more of the ‘noble body, 
furnished almost to bursting point with all that it needed’ of 
Kafka’s panther. Its ‘limbs’ form an open star shape whereas 
one of Kantor’s arms is wrapped awkwardly behind his head, 
the other is invisible beyond the picture frame and the ‘real’ left 
leg that projects into the spectator’s space looks decidedly 
suspicious, carrying a connotation of the collection of artificial 
limbs in one of the vitrines at the Auschwitz museum. The key 
difference, however, is that Lissitzky’s figure lies wholly within 
the frame of its picture. It is the attempt of Kantor’s figure to exit 
the frame that lends it its particular power.
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[Image removed due to file size]
Mam dość siedzenia w obrazie. Wychodzę. (I’ve had enough of sitting in this 
painting. I’m leaving, 1987. Courtesy of, Michal Kobialka, and also Dorota Krakowska 
and Maria Stangret-Kantor for the Estate of Tadeusz Kantor. Thanks to Anna Halczak 
of the Cricoteka for supplying the image.)
Kantor’s painting sets up a paradoxical interplay of 
references to both the visible and the invisible. The fact that 
only the fictional portions of Kantor and the chair are visible 
whilst the implied versions of them in the real world of the 
viewer are invisible might lead to the interpretation of the 
painting as indicative of the overall title of the series: Further on, 
Nothing …. Is Kantor stepping into the void of non-existence, 
looking back at the past and away from the death he already 
has one foot in? Is the one protruding leg merely a dead relic? 
In this sense the paradox of this painting can be seen as the 
tension between, on the one hand the longing for the past, and 
for life, and on the other, the potency and courage of being able 
to choose to step into the void of non-existence.
But on the other hand the protruding leg is three-
dimensional in comparison with the two-dimensionality of the 
rest of the picture. In that sense it is more ‘real’ than the painted 
leg. However, it is nevertheless artificial and not animate: it is 
not a real leg, merely a real artificial leg. There is more than one 
layer of imitation at play within this work. The artificiality of the 
three-dimensional leg in one sense actually destroys the illusion 
it is apparently purporting to create. If that leg is an indication of 
the ‘reality’ of the figure—ex-painting—then it would be a very 
un-übermarionette indeed, a very poor-mannequin-of-a-figure. 
Paradoxically, when viewed in this way, the painted version of 
the figure would seem more ‘real’. But in that case the illusion of 
the fiction of the painted figure would trounce reality. But, as 
with Malevich’s Black Square and its distillation of the 
presencing of reality performed by icons, there is a sense in 
which Kantor’s painting confounds the binary opposition of 
‘real’ and ‘illusory’, ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’, fiction and reality. For 
example, viewed from the perspective of the painted figure 
inside the painting, the ‘real’ and ‘visible’ would equate with the 
two-dimensional realm contained within the surface of the 
canvas. The ‘illusory’ and ‘invisible’ world for this figure would 
equate to the four-dimensional spatiotemporal reality of the 
viewer’s world. Viewed from the spectator’s perspective it is the 
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world of the figure in the painting that is ‘illusory’. However, 
what, for the spectator in the real world outside of the painting, 
equates with the ‘invisible’? Surely it is the world of the painting 
that is implicitly extended past the borders of the canvas in the 
form of the artificial leg. However, this ‘world’ seems partially 
visible, in the form of the artificial leg, and partly invisible in the 
(non)form of the half of the chair that has been cut off by the 
right hand edge of the painting (from the spectator’s 
perspective). This aspect of the painting’s world does not enjoy 
a visible physical presence outside of its canvas in the way that 
the left leg of the painted figure does. The force of this painting 
is, therefore, partly to do with the impossible act that it is 
attempting to stage. The spectator of the painting knows that 
the idea of the painted figure actually stepping out of the canvas 
into the real world is an impossibility. Even the idea of it is an 
illusion. In fact the ‘reality’ of this idea is itself invisible; the 
artificial limb is merely a stimulus for the idea. This is signalled 
all the more by the ‘poor’ and somewhat inept nature of the 
artificial limb. One could imagine, for example, artists such as 
Jeff Koons, or Jake and Dinos Chapman, articulating a more 
polished form for this limb’s entrance to the spectator’s 
dimension. Kantor’s limb is in the spirit of Bruno Schulz’s 
celebration of the tandeta of sham reality in the Street of 
Crocodiles. It is a Schulzian limb, a poor and shoddy imitation, 
a joke. Nevertheless, both the spectator and the painted figure 
confront one another in an uneasy dialogue around this limb, 
since the work imposes on the viewer the idea of its own 
movement beyond itself, beyond its immediate painted reality. 
However, this ‘beyond itself’, in its very impossibility, is also 
suggestive of another reality—a ‘reality beyond reality’, perhaps  
the ‘reality’ of eternity, perhaps the ‘reality’ of death. Like the 
figures chasing each other around John Keats’ ‘Grecian Urn’, 
‘For ever warm and still to be enjoyed, / For ever panting, and 
for ever young (Keats 1973: 345, ll. 26–27), Kantor’s painting is 
forever enacting the potentiality of its own impossible, 
paradoxical transgression. For the prisoners in Plato’s cave, the 
reality of the machinery of illusion behind them is concealed, as 
is the sunlit world beyond the cave’s entrance. However, in 
Kantor’s painting, it is by no means clear who is in the situation 
of the Platonic prisoner: the spectator or the painted figure in 
the picture? Both are arguably in positions of ignorance with 
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respect to the potential reality proposed by the painting: the 
painted figure of the world outside his frame; the spectator of 
that same ‘reality’ in so far as its very invisibility presages 
another reality beyond his or her own.
The ‘Last Supper’ in the ‘Poor Little Room of the 
Imagination’: The Fatal Return
Although Kantor’s eyes in this painting are ‘looking back’ in the 
manner of Rilke’s image of humanity, which Heidegger 
criticises, Kantor’s figure is still stepping forward. This 
paradoxical sense of simultaneous reverse and forward 
movement between past and future is a characteristic found 
throughout Kantor’s work, but is particularly evident in the late 
works considered here. In his penultimate major spectacle, I 
Shall Never Return, made during the same period as the 
Further on, Nothing … series of paintings, Kantor invokes the 
myth of the return of Odysseus to Ithaca. For Kantor, this myth13 
stood as an allegory of the artist’s relationship with reality14  and 
the meaning was that ‘return’ is only possible as a ‘return’ to 
death. The figure of Penelope in this respect stands as a 
symbol for Death as the ultimate reality: she was portrayed in 
the 1988 production as a young woman who longs for the return 
of her betrothed. For Kantor, who, like Kafka, found love anew 
at the end of his life, the paradoxical proximity of Love and 
Death was a powerful reality.15 This is why, in his late work, 
Kantor portrayed Death in the form of an attractive young 
woman, and why the figure of Penelope, the faithful wife who 
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13 Kantor staged an underground production of Stanisław Wyspiańskiʼs The 
Return of Odysseus, a dark dramatic version of this tale, near the beginning 
of his artistic career, in Kraków, in 1944.
14 In I Shall Never Return Kantor is confronted by his own actors in the guise 
of roles from his previous productions, culminating in a re-staging of the 
banquet scene in which Odysseus murders the suitors.
15 In 1923 Kafka, then just turned forty, met the twenty-five year old Dora 
Diamant, with whom he fell in love. Dora helped nurse Kafka until his death 
in 1924 (Murray 2005: 357–384). Around 1985 Kantor met and began an 
affair with Anna Halczak who became his companion and muse during his 
final years. The affair continued until Kantorʼs death (see: Gołubiew 2000: 
50–52 for a discussion of Kantor's recognition of the proximity of love and 
death in his last years).
waits for her husband’s eventual return, became the symbol of 
both Death and Reality, in opposition to the Imagination. The 
‘life’ of human being, viewed from this perspective is truly ‘a 
machine of love and death’: a mechanism that produces the 
particular being of humanity within its finite temporal bubble, 
hanging in the timelessness of eternity.
The sense of defeat that is present in the hunger artist’s 
death, and in so many of Kafka’s protagonists, is not present in 
Kantor’s stagings of his own crossing of the barrier between life 
and death. At the end of Today is My Birthday, the ‘Poor Little 
Room of the Imagination’ is filled with cemetery crosses before 
being overrun by soldiers, police cars, tanks, party-secretaries, 
secret policemen and murderers. To the accompaniment of the 
rising and falling strains of, alternatively, Offenbach’s La Belle 
Hélène and the funeral march from the second movement of  
Beethoven’s Eroica symphony, caged and screaming human 
figures are wheeled about the stage as if they were circus 
animals on display. In the midst of this carnage, the figures of 
Kantor’s remembered family members stage a slow funeral 
procession bearing a single wooden plank through the chaos to 
the front of the stage. They arrange the plank into a crude table 
which they sit behind as if for a Last Supper, reminiscent of the 
final image of Wielopole, Wielopole. Despite the apparent 
defeat of this last refuge of the individual:
Against
these ‘powers’
stands the
S m a l l ,
P o o r ,
D e f e n c e l e s s ,
but magnificent
history of
i n d i v i d u a l ,
h u m a n
l i f e .
(Kantor in: Kobialka 1993: 167).
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This final tableau, with its intimations of the eternal, 
advances the silent strength of the bare fact of the fragile, 
individual, poor human life.
Conclusion
As Agamben noted, rooms or stanzas are not just literally 
rooms but also homes in which human being dwells, a space 
for the free play of memory. In Kantor’s late work, rooms 
become a poetic space, a means for pointing towards the 
unveiling of truth about mortality and finitude. In these last 
works where he repeatedly attempted to visualise the crossing 
of the borderline between existence and non-existence, even as  
he approached that frontier himself, Tadeusz Kantor, like his 
self-portrait attempting to leave his own painting, seems to have 
been attempting the impossible. He was attempting to linger at 
the threshold of nothingness as if to see for himself, and to 
show his spectators, what lies beyond the negation of 
existence. In this way Kantor can be seen to have organised 
the live enactment of the icon’s manner of presencing truth. In a 
sense it is reversed again, for while the icon looks at its 
spectator, and while that is still the case with Kantor’s late and 
last work, Kantor looks back at eternity and, in doing so, 
encourages his spectators to join him in the contemplation of 
this impossible but all-enveloping idea. It is, therefore, no 
surprise that these works can be read in the light of Heidegger 
and Kafka who both, in their own ways, attempted to 
characterise the nature of human existence in its relation to 
finitude—to death. Heidegger envisages an abstract dwelling 
for human being illuminated by the truth of the revealed true 
nature of the temporal transience and finitude of human 
existence, while Kafka’s protagonists die like dogs, sometimes 
glimpsing a distant radiance. Kantor’s late paintings and theatre 
works present a ‘poor’, but nevertheless positive vision of the 
human animal: a poor individual temporarily lodged for a while 
in the ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’.
Martin Leach is a senior lecturer in performance at De Montfort 
University where he teaches anatomy, physiology and 
philosophy in the School of Arts. He read English and Drama at 
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the University of Hull before studying theatre directing in Poland 
in the early 1980s.
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